Whether that posture holds depends on facts not yet in the public record: the durability of the ceasefire architecture, the cohesion of the pressure coalition, and Iran's own calculation of what the sanctions cost against what the nuclear programme is worth.
The United States believes its economic pressure campaign on Iran has been successful and can help prevent the Islamic Republic from acquiring a nuclear weapon without restarting large-scale combat operations in the Middle East, according to the Associated Press, citing sources. TASS reports that, according to those sources, Washington has other ways to address the Iranian nuclear programme without renewing military strikes.
The reported assessment follows a turbulent year in the American-led confrontation with Tehran. The United States and Israel launched a war against Iran on 28 February. In June, Washington and Tehran signed a memorandum of understanding providing for an immediate ceasefire on all fronts, including in Lebanon. That arrangement did not hold: the US resumed large-scale attacks on Iran overnight on 8 July, accusing Tehran of breaching the existing agreements concerning the Strait of Hormuz.
Washington subsequently announced an end to any large-scale use of force against Iran and a transition to applying economic pressure through sanctions instead. The AP reporting, as carried by TASS, suggests that this shift is now being presented internally as a workable strategy rather than a pause, with officials arguing that economic tools can achieve the nuclear objective that military operations were meant to secure.
The significance lies in what it signals about American intent. A sanctions-led approach lowers the immediate risk of renewed strikes and the regional escalation that would follow, including disruption around the Strait of Hormuz, through which a substantial share of global seaborne oil passes. It also shifts the burden of proof onto the pressure campaign itself: if economic measures are to substitute for force, their effect on Iranian decision-making must be demonstrable, and over a timeframe that Washington's partners and domestic critics will accept.
Much remains unconfirmed. The reporting rests on unnamed sources and does not specify which options are under consideration, what benchmarks would define success, or whether Israel shares the American assessment. The state of the June memorandum of understanding is also unclear, given the July accusations of breach and the subsequent resumption of hostilities. Nor is it established how Tehran reads the shift to sanctions, or whether it regards economic pressure as a basis for negotiation or as a continuation of the confrontation by other means.
What can be said is that Washington appears to be consolidating a position in which coercion continues, but through financial and commercial channels rather than air strikes. Whether that posture holds depends on facts not yet in the public record: the durability of the ceasefire architecture, the cohesion of the pressure coalition, and Iran's own calculation of what the sanctions cost against what the nuclear programme is worth.



