What is clear is that the war's labour market now reaches well beyond Europe's neighbourhood, and that the routes into it often begin with a job advertisement.
Ukraine says it has captured its first Indonesian prisoner of war, a 49-year-old man from Java who, according to the state-run I Want to Live project, was sent to the Zaporizhzhia region to take part in a Russian assault and reached Ukrainian-held territory after his group came under drone attack. The capture is a small event on a long frontline, but it gives a name and a nationality to a recruitment effort that Kyiv says has grown sharply this year.
According to the I Want to Live project, some 283 Indonesians were recruited in the first nine months of this year to fight for Russia against Ukraine. Over the previous three years, the project says, recruitment from Indonesia numbered no more than ten. The Russian embassy in Jakarta did not immediately respond to questions about the alleged recruitment effort, the Guardian reports, so the figures remain Kyiv's account rather than a confirmed count.
The pattern is familiar. In February, Kenya's intelligence services reported that more than 1,000 Kenyans had been lured to fight for Russia, and growing numbers of people from Kenya, Uganda, South Africa and elsewhere have been drawn to the frontline as Moscow seeks help to sustain a war now in its fifth year. What is new is the geography. South-east Asia, and Indonesia in particular, appears to have become a recruiting ground, and the mechanisms described by Indonesian police are those of organised crime rather than military enlistment.
This month Jakarta urged Moscow to ensure no Indonesians were drafted into its military, following the reported death in October of an Indonesian national serving with the Russian military. A foreign ministry spokesperson, Yvonne Mewengkang, said the government had asked Russia to take all necessary steps to ensure Indonesians would not be recruited into the Russian military or any military-related position through any avenue, and said Jakarta was particularly concerned about practices that could constitute human trafficking. Days later, Indonesian police said they had identified a trafficking syndicate targeting nationals through social media and messaging apps, offering lucrative jobs in logistics, border security and defence construction; once applicants reached Russia, police said, they were directed to sign contracts as mercenaries, with some deployed to conflict zones.
The implications run in several directions. For Indonesia, the case tests a foreign policy built on non-alignment: a government that has declined to take sides in Ukraine now finds its citizens on the Russian payroll and its police investigating recruiters at home. For Moscow, recruitment abroad is a way of filling ranks without a further domestic mobilisation, but each foreign casualty carries diplomatic cost with governments that might otherwise stay quiet. For Kyiv, the prisoner is both intelligence and propaganda, and the I Want to Live project, set up in September 2022 by the coordination headquarters for prisoners of war with support from the defence ministry and defence intelligence, is designed to encourage surrender by foreign recruits as much as Russian servicemen.
Much is not yet confirmed. The number of Indonesians recruited, the terms of their contracts, the role of Russian officials and the fate of those already deployed are known mainly through Ukrainian and Indonesian statements. The Russian embassy has not answered the questions put to it. What is clear is that the war's labour market now reaches well beyond Europe's neighbourhood, and that the routes into it often begin with a job advertisement.




