Asking its Director General to issue a condemnation as the price of renewed inspections places the agency in an awkward position: compliance would expose it to charges of taking sides, while refusal keeps monitoring in abeyance.
Iran remains a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and is committed to all its provisions, including those on the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, according to a Foreign Ministry spokesman quoted by TASS. Esmaeil Baghaei told a press conference in Tehran that the programme "is entirely peaceful and remains so," adding that while Iran remains a party, it is committed to complying with the treaty.
The formulation is conditional, and that conditionality is the substance of the statement. Baghaei framed Iran's compliance as contingent on its continued membership of the NPT rather than as an unconditional obligation, which leaves open the question of what would follow a withdrawal. The source material does not say whether any such step is under consideration, and no timeline is given.
On inspections, Baghaei said it is too early to discuss resuming International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring at Iranian nuclear facilities. He set a precondition: the IAEA's Director General, Rafael Grossi, must first condemn US and Israeli attacks on Iran's nuclear infrastructure. The report does not specify which attacks are meant, when they occurred, or what damage was caused, and it gives no indication of how the IAEA has responded to the demand.
The linkage matters because the IAEA's access rests on a mandate that is technical rather than political. Asking its Director General to issue a condemnation as the price of renewed inspections places the agency in an awkward position: compliance would expose it to charges of taking sides, while refusal keeps monitoring in abeyance. The report does not say whether Grossi has been formally asked, nor whether the agency has commented.
For outside observers, the statement offers reassurance and ambiguity in equal measure. The reaffirmation of NPT membership is a signal of continuity, and Tehran has chosen to make it publicly through its Foreign Ministry rather than leave it implicit. But the absence of inspections means that assurances about the peaceful character of the programme rest on declaration rather than verification. The report does not describe the current state of Iran's enrichment activity, its stockpile, or the status of any prior safeguards questions.
What is not yet known is substantial. There is no confirmed account of the attacks Baghaei cited, no stated timetable for a decision on inspections, and no response from the IAEA or from the governments named. Whether the precondition is a negotiating position or a firm barrier cannot be determined from the statement alone. What the report does establish is that Tehran is presenting its NPT membership as the guarantee of its programme's peaceful intent, and that the return of international monitoring is now tied to a political demand addressed to the nuclear watchdog itself.
