The new geometry is not simply a replacement of Western by Eastern influence. It is more fragmented, more transactional, and less institutionalised.
The sequence of coups across the Sahel — Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad — represents more than political instability in a historically fragile region. It marks a structural shift in the security geometry of West and Central Africa, with consequences that extend well beyond the immediate crises.
What is being renegotiated is the post-colonial security architecture. The French security presence that had underwritten regional stability — however imperfectly, however controversially — is in retreat. The Wagner Group, now rebranded but functionally continuous under Russian state direction, has moved into the space created by that retreat. American influence, never dominant but meaningfully present, faces its own crisis of credibility.
The new geometry is not simply a replacement of Western by Eastern influence. It is a more fragmented, more transactional, and less institutionalised arrangement. Junta governments seeking external security assistance have more options than their predecessors did — which gives them leverage but also creates exposure to the instability of transactional partnerships.
The civilian populations caught within this shifting geometry have not been consulted. The insurgencies that prompted the coups — and that the coups promised to end — continue. In several cases, the security situation has deteriorated since the transitions. The political legitimacy claimed by junta governments rests on promises of security and sovereignty that the underlying conditions do not support.
What the Sahel geometry reveals is a region in the middle of a long transition whose endpoint is not visible. The old order had serious failures. The new arrangements do not yet constitute an order at all.
