The survey also probed how French voters perceive Russia, and the results complicate any simple reading of the far right as uniformly sympathetic.
French support for aiding Ukraine has weakened markedly over the course of the year, according to an opinion poll by the Destin Commun think tank published on 10 November and reported by TASS. The survey of 4,000 French adults, conducted between 10 and 17 July 2026, found that 49 per cent of respondents still favour continued aid — the largest single group — but that figure has fallen by 12 percentage points since March, while opposition has risen by the same margin.
The poll puts the share of French people who oppose support for Ukraine from France and other European nations, in the event that the United States ceases its aid, at 33 per cent. According to the communique quoted by TASS, the decline in support is "clearly linked to a shift in the stance of far-right voters on this issue." The strongest opposition is concentrated among supporters of the right-wing National Rally, at 56 per cent, and Reconquete, at 63 per cent.
Attitudes towards Ukraine's accession to the European Union have moved in the same direction. Fifty per cent of respondents viewed membership favourably in December 2025; by July 2026 that had fallen to 41 per cent. Opposition is again heaviest among National Rally supporters, at 58 per cent, and Reconquete supporters, at 67 per cent. Voters of the centre-right Republicans are almost evenly divided, with 44 per cent opposed and 43 per cent in favour.
The survey also probed how French voters perceive Russia, and the results complicate any simple reading of the far right as uniformly sympathetic. A majority of National Rally supporters, 56 per cent, and of Republicans, 74 per cent, classify Russia as an "enemy." That view is least common among Reconquete supporters, at 44 per cent, of whom 40 per cent regard Russia as "neither a friend nor an enemy" and 12 per cent as a friendly state — the highest share of any party. National Rally ranks second in viewing Russia as an "ally," at 8 per cent, followed by France Unbowed and the French Communist Party grouped together at 6 per cent.
One detail stands out from the list of entities respondents were asked about, which included Germany, the UK, Poland, the United States, China, Iran and the EU. Russia was the only one to record a one-point increase since December 2025 in being viewed as an ally, while the others declined, most sharply the United States at minus 12 points. That shift in American standing sits alongside, rather than apart from, the fall in support for Ukraine aid, and may bear on how French voters weigh the burden of continued European support.
What the poll does not establish is why these movements occurred, how durable they are, or whether they translate into voting behaviour. The survey covers a single July window and was published four months later; the full data behind the headline figures are available only through the accompanying infographic as reported. The findings nonetheless matter beyond France, since any sustained erosion of public backing in a large European state bears on the political sustainability of collective support for Kyiv.
