By grounding the claim in a published doctrine rather than a specific incident, the ministry is signalling that retaliation need not be proportionate in form, only in purpose.
Russia's Foreign Ministry has restated its claim to a legal basis for retaliation against other states, pointing to the country's foreign policy concept adopted on 31 March 2023. According to TASS, spokeswoman Maria Zakharova told a news briefing that clause 26 of the document sets out the conditions under which Moscow considers such measures legitimate.
Zakharova was responding to remarks by Security Council Secretary Sergey Shoigu, who said that specialists are being trained in Poland and the Baltic states for activities aimed at undermining Russia from within. The spokeswoman quoted the clause directly: where foreign states commit unfriendly actions posing a threat to Russia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, the country considers it legitimate to take symmetrical and asymmetrical measures necessary to suppress those actions and to prevent their recurrence.
The formulation is broad, and that is the point. By grounding the claim in a published doctrine rather than a specific incident, the ministry is signalling that retaliation need not be proportionate in form, only in purpose. The reference to preventing recurrence also stretches the justification forward in time, potentially covering measures taken well after the original action. The TASS report does not say what measures might be contemplated, against which states, or on what timetable.
The context matters. Shoigu's allegation concerns training in Poland and the Baltic states, all NATO members, and the ministry's response ties that allegation to a doctrine clause about sovereignty and territorial integrity. The report gives no evidence for the training claim and no detail on which institutions or individuals are said to be involved. Nor does it indicate whether any diplomatic démarche, sanctions listing or other concrete step has followed the briefing.
What is not yet known is substantial. The report does not identify the unfriendly actions at issue beyond Shoigu's remarks, does not specify what symmetrical or asymmetrical measures might mean in practice, and does not indicate whether the doctrine citation is a precursor to action or a rhetorical restatement of an existing position. It is also unclear whether other parts of the 2023 concept are being invoked alongside clause 26. Readers should treat the briefing as a statement of claimed entitlement rather than a description of measures already decided.
The significance lies in the public rehearsal of the doctrine. Citing a published clause gives Moscow a ready-made vocabulary for justifying responses across different domains, and it places the burden of interpretation on the states named. For Warsaw and the Baltic capitals, the practical question is whether the language presages anything beyond words. On the material available, that question cannot be answered.
